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Significant Economic Developments Since the
Armistice *
By Herbert F. Boettler
The significant economic results of the world war are to be
found in the profound changes produced not only in the inter
national relations of the United States but also in the methods and
policies of her business men. The past decade has witnessed
events of such a revolutionary character that it is often difficult to
appreciate their full significance. While the world war was the
outstanding event of this period, its importance lies not so much in
the actual physical destruction which it wrought as in the funda
mental economic, social and political changes that it produced.
The latter factors are the ones which must be understood and
appraised in order to obtain a clear comprehension of present and
future conditions. Their significance is often lost sight of, because
compared to the spectacular events of the conflict they appear as
humdrum affairs of minor importance. To deal at any length
with these changes in Europe is beyond the scope of this paper.
Briefly to indicate a few of them will be sufficient. One has only
to mention the political changes in Europe to call to mind their
magnitude. The swing of the political pendulum from monarchy
to democracy and from constitutional government to dictatorship
is a matter of common knowledge. In the field of finance,
changes in Europe have been just as revolutionary. How
currency debasement penalized the creditor class, destroyed the
life savings of countless thousands of men and women and re
warded the debtor classes is so well known that repetition would
be superfluous.
Important as these sudden social and political shifts were to the
world, the really significant results of the war for the United States
were in the field of international economic relations. The im
portance of these new developments can scarcely be over
emphasized. Changing the status of the United States from a
debtor to a creditor nation in less than ten years was probably the
outstanding economic result of the war from the international
point of view. The rapidity with which this change took place
*A paper read before the St. Louis Chapter of the Missouri Society of Certified Public
Accountants, January, 1926.
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unsettled the world’s economic equilibrium and set in motion
forces whose ultimate effects only the future can reveal. For over
a century, prior to the world war, the United States had been
importing labor and borrowing capital from Europe with which to
develop the natural resources of America. This relationship was
favorable to both parties, especially from a business point of view,
because it presented a minimum of difficulty to satisfactory
political relations or to the making of international payments
between the interested parties. The United States was a new
country, rich in natural resources and capable of producing an
abundance of foodstuffs. Our productive power in these fields
was far in excess of domestic requirements. What we most re
quired was labor and liquid capital in order to utilize our natural
resources. Europe was in a position to supply both. In ex
change for the use of her capital and such exports as we could
employ, she received raw materials and food. In these circum
stances the debts of the United States to Europe presented few
difficulties to the settlement of international accounts. We had
what Europe needed and Europe had what we wanted. Numerous
estimates prior to the world war showed that we owed to Europe
several billions of dollars on capital account, the interest upon
which we paid largely in exports of raw materials.
The termination of the world war saw all this changed. In less
than six years the accumulated investments which Europe had
been making in this country for over a century were all wiped out
and Europe became our debtor for from 15 to 18 billion dollars, if
governmental and private debts are combined. Whereas in
the past Europe could pay for that portion of her imports from
the United States which could not be balanced in goods with the
interest and dividends from her American investments, she now
must find other means for payment, because no great change has
taken place in her requirements for raw materials from us. In
addition to finding a new means to pay for her American imports
she must find a way to pay the interest on and a portion of the
principal of the debts which she now owes us. The difficulties
involved in making such payments are not always apparent, be
cause in proportion to the estimated wealth of Europe her debts
superficially do not appear as unmanageable. In international
relationships, however, ownership of wealth is one thing but its
transfer from one country to another is something entirely
different. Between one nation and another the means by which
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payments can be made are limited. Fundamentally, there are
only three sound methods: first, by means of goods and services;
second, by payment in gold; third, by borrowing. Europe finds
it difficult to buy from us or to pay her debts to us for the
reason that she has already practically exhausted two of the means
available for making payments—payment in gold and by borrow
ing. The one remaining method still open to her, namely, the
shipment of goods to us, is of only limited availability because
Europe has few commodities to offer the United States which are
acceptable in sufficient quantity to solve the problem.
Except for certain raw materials the principal products that
Europe has to offer us are manufactured goods, many of which
compete with American products. Against such goods our
traditional protective policy has created a tariff barrier and thus
Europe is further handicapped in making payments in this form.
As long as Europe’s principal resource in the international
market is labor which can be exported for debt-paying purposes
only in the form of manufactured goods, this difficulty will
probably continue. If we were willing to accept full payment in
this manner the problem would soon be solved. This, however,
we refuse to do, since such payments might prove more injurious
than beneficial. In these circumstances it is not surprising that
various European business men are making every effort, in so far
as possible, to adopt whatever other means may be available to
them for minimizing the difficulty involved in making payments
to the United States. The most recent efforts of this kind, which
have been attracting widespread attention, are the attempts to
secure control of certain essential raw materials upon which the
United States is largely dependent. England has already gained
control of the world’s supply of rubber. Recent reports have it
that groups in other countries are now seeking more effective
price control of such commodities as quinine, iodine, nitrates and
potash, coffee, silks, quicksilver and wood pulp, the underlying
idea in all probability being that if this can be accomplished the
burden of making purchases in either the United States or in other
countries, or of paying debts, will be materially reduced. How
serious a world-wide scramble to secure control of essential raw
materials might be and the strain which such an economic quarrel
might place upon international goodwill is only one of the many
important problems growing out of the change which has taken
place in the world’s economic balance as a result of the war.
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Underlying Basis

of

Post-bellum Business Revival

The war not only produced important changes in international
economic relations, but it also had a very profound effect upon
domestic business conditions in the United States. For the first
few years following the war the economic situation was so clouded
with new and unusual problems that it was difficult to obtain a
clear view of the situation. While business is still far from being
free from these developments, the past few years have witnessed
some rather definite progress in clarifying the trend of the more
important underlying tendencies affecting business. Gradually
the significant fundamental changes are beginning to stand out in
bolder relief and we can understand why certain developments did
occur and others, which were expected, failed to materialize. In
1921, industry, agriculture and finance all faced problems of un
precedented gravity, both at home and abroad, and it was not
surprising that few men were able to pierce the veil of the future.
It appeared as though the world was faced with a long period of
subnormal activity. In the field of finance the outlook seemed
dark indeed. The dearth of liquid capital was world-wide, and
debts, both governmental and private, were so huge that it was a
rather common belief that as a result of the war’s destruction the
world would be faced with a capital shortage for many years to
come. As long as this lasted, industry would be handicapped by
high interest rates which would discourage production, make for
unemployment and cause an extended period of depression.
Such a situation would in turn have its influence on prices, cause
a further decline and thus magnify the burden of existing debts.
In view of this depressing outlook in 1920 and 1921, what were
the basic forces which caused so rapid and extraordinary a re
covery in American business and why did the generally expected
fail to occur? As has so often been the case in the past, events
proved greater than men, and the ingenuity of the individual man in
solving his own problems was more potent than all the concerted
efforts that could be devised. Providence rather than human
wisdom solved most of our problems. Our difficulties at that
time loomed large, while the favorable factors which existed were
hidden in the background. Almost before the country had been
able to make a full appraisal of its problems, underlying forces
took charge and began laying the foundation for recovery. This
fact is well illustrated in the case of the commission appointed by
President Harding to study the problem of unemployment.
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When its findings were published unemployment had practically
disappeared.
The reasons for these rapid favorable changes are now fairly
clear. Fundamentally, the very desperation of Europe helped to
bring about a business recovery in the United States. That few
people could foresee the manner in which poverty-stricken Europe
was to help us is not surprising. Our strategic position with
respect to foodstuffs and raw materials again proved to be our
salvation. Europe, and the whole world, in truth, was in
desperate need of food and raw materials, and to obtain them the
last line of reserves was drawn upon—accumulated gold stocks.
Almost before we were able to realize it gold began to flow to our
shores in enormous quantities. The effect of this was quickly
felt not only in the field of finance but in industry as well. Our
banking reserves were rapidly built up, the credit base of the
country enlarged, and, consequently, frozen credits began to thaw
out, or at least a means by which they could be thawed out
became available. As the credit situation became easier industry
found it possible to fund its short-term bank loans into long-term
obligations. Once the problem of meeting pressing current
obligations was removed, industrial activity on a large scale
became possible. As interest rates declined the whole business
outlook took on a changed appearance and certain underlying
forces became potent and began making themselves felt. The
accumulated building and housing shortage was crying for relief;
the needs of our transportation companies and public utilities were
equally pressing and the necessity for new equipment and exten
sions was imperative. With credit again ample, money cheap,
an abundant labor supply available, and all necessary raw ma
terials at hand, it was not long before the country set to work to
replace the many shortages that existed in different fields. This
activity supplied the necessary impetus for a real revival which
has now been in progress for over five years. Once the up-swing
began, its own momentum helped to carry it forward. Increased
employment of labor enlarged the demand for a variety of goods,
and thus industry was further stimulated. In this way particularly
the automotive and allied industries were favorably affected.

Part Played

by

New Business Policies

in

Revival

So far as the initial impetus to the post-bellum business revival
in the United States is concerned, little credit can be claimed by
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anyone. On the other hand, the way in which business executives
met their individual problems growing out of the war and the
extent to which they profited by experience and developed new
policies in business conduct constitutes an interesting chapter in
the history of American business. After-war problems produced
at least three major changes in policy. While perhaps not new,
they have at least been raised to a position of greater importance
than they ever occupied before, and in all probability they will
have a lasting influence upon the future. These three outstanding
developments in the post-bellum business policy in the United
States are: first, hand-to-mouth buying; second, quantity pro
duction; and third, instalment selling. Which of these three
factors has been the most important it is difficult to say. Each
is playing a star r61e in American business.

Hand-to-mouth Buying
Much as we have heard of the development of the hand-tomouth buying policy, it is seldom that its significance is fully
appreciated. This policy probably found its origin in the excesses
to which the old policy of forward buying had been carried during
the period of rising prices when business men for a while became
more interested in commodity speculation for a rise than in
covering the normal requirements of demand. In its initial stages
hand-to-mouth buying expressed essentially the cautious attitude
of business, which was the natural reaction from over-buying,
price declines and losses. That it had advantages other than
those which arise from caution soon became apparent. As the
transportation facilities of the country steadily improved, the
desirability and feasibility of hand-to-mouth buying increased,
and business executives found that it afforded opportunities that
they had never previously suspected. First, they discovered that
by careful buying, covering only their actual requirements,
business was placed upon a sounder basis than that upon which it
had previously rested. It afforded what amounted to an oppor
tunity to hedge future requirements, since purchases were re
stricted to materials for which a market had already been made.
Second, by obtaining a more rapid turnover of inventory, working
capital requirements were lessened and an additional advantage
was obtained from this source. Third, it was found that this
policy made for increased efficiency throughout practically all the
productive processes. It made possible a closer check on in346
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ventory, and consequently kept it in better balance. It reduced
depreciation and possible losses that might arise through ob
solescence when purchases covering a long period were in vogue.
Fourth, it gave to industry an opportunity more closely to ap
proach an ideal which it had long sought, namely, that of keeping
production in better balance with demand.
While this change in industrial policy was not universally
favorable to all elements in the business world, its advantages
have undoubtedly outweighed its disadvantages. It is true that
the change has shifted a portion of the burden which formerly
rested upon one of the factors in production to another. In the
early stages of its development it appeared merely to shift the
burden from the wholesaler and distributor to the manufacturer.
The manufacturer, however, has apparently succeeded in meeting
the new problem, and while the burden may in some few instances
be unduly heavy on some units in business, the net result has been
to spread productive activity over the entire year somewhat more
evenly than in the past. In other words, for the time at least
one accomplishment of this new policy may be to reduce the peaks
and valleys in the curve of production. That it has certain
disadvantages, however, is quite apparent. Purchase in smaller
lots tends to increase both distribution and sales cost. While the
transportation companies have probably gained something
through levelling business demand, others have lost. Salesmen,
who formerly were able to make one or two trips a year, now must
make calls more often. Where one or two shipments were
sufficient in the past, several are now required. However, taking
all these factors into consideration it is doubtful whether business
will ever return to its old policy in the extreme forms of the period
just prior to the close of the world war. The gains made in
reducing the risk of price changes, in obtaining a swifter mer
chandise turnover, and the effect of these factors upon capital
requirements are advantages that will not quickly be given up.

Quantity Production
The second important change in business policy has been the
increased development of quantity production. Mass production
and standardized methods of manufacture are not new. They
probably found their beginning with the development of the
factory system. The war and the subsequent period, however,
have given to this method, especially in the United States, a re347
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newed impetus that has proven an important factor in our postbellum revival. Quantity production has been the means by
which we have been able to meet the problem of rising raw
material costs in such a way as to keep the price of finished products
within reasonable bounds. Through large-scale production and
standardization, human efficiency in production has been in
creased and the standard of living raised. The advantages of this
method have been so clearly demonstrated that it has changed
many of the ideas regarding big business which existed twentyfive or thirty years ago. The first reaction of the American public
to big business and large-scale production was decidedly un
favorable. In its original form quantity production was looked
upon as a menace—an attempt to secure monopoly control for the
purpose of securing unreasonable profits. For a while the com
bined forces of society made every effort to prevent developments
of this character. Despite anti-trust laws, the opposition of labor
and all the penalties assessed against big business, quantity pro
duction held its own and demonstrated that its advantages
came not alone from monopolistic price control but from its
efficiency and from the principle of a small profit on a large unit
production. Today practically all the important conveniences of
modern life are made available through the use of these productive
methods. We have only to mention a few articles such as shoes,
automobiles, electric lights and the thousand and one other
essential commodities that would be out of the reach of the
majority of people were it not for this method of production.

Instalment Selling
One of the most interesting developments that has taken place
in business policy since the war has been in the rather extraor
dinary expansion in time-payment sales methods. While funda
mentally there is nothing new in this method—the plan is
probably as old as credit—its importance lies in its widespread
application recently in a somewhat novel way. Modern instal
ment selling has been most highly developed in the automobile
industry. As a result of the extraordinary demands on this
industry, new agencies especially designed for the purpose of
financing the consumer have been developed. The remarkable
success of this method of selling in the automobile industry has
given a new impetus to the use of time-payment sales. Com
petitive conditions have now spread the plan to almost every
348
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conceivable salable object. Credit companies which originally
specialized in automobile finance now handle a variety of things.
Gradually the plan is spreading from goods having some per
manency of value to purely consumptive goods, such as clothing.
While specialized credit companies do not finance by any means
all classes of time-payment business, competition is compelling
more and more merchants to adopt the new plan in some form.
One of the unfortunate results of this situation lies in the essential
difference between the financing of time-payment sales through
a specialized agency and by the retailer or distributor himself.
Where specialized agencies exist, much of the credit burden and
the expense of collection has been shifted from the retailer to the
finance company and the consumer. Under these conditions the
problem of the producer and distributor becomes essentially one
of gauging demand, and the burden of financing the deferred pay
ments, together with the profit from the service rendered, is now
placed upon the shoulders of the buyer. The finance company
steps in between the buyer and the seller and charges the buyer for
the privilege which it gives to him of spreading the deferred pay
ments over a stated period of time. Consequently, in one sense
the finance companies of this type can be thought of as specialized
collection agencies engaged in the business of buying accounts
receivable which are to be paid in accordance with some definite
plan. The significant service which these companies have per
formed has been in definitely shifting the burden of time payments
to the consumer who wishes to utilize this plan. Where special
financial facilities are not available a considerable burden rests
upon the retailer or distributor. Without a well developed col
lection department and the additional capital which the finance
company supplies, the burden of financing deferred payments
under existing competitive conditions is not easy.
However, aside from this particular phase of instalment selling
there are at least four essential questions that should be con
sidered in making any appraisal of this plan of merchandising:
First, what are the advantages of the plan as it is being utilized
at present? Second, is it universally applicable on a sound basis
to all classes of goods and services? Third, is the stimulus which
it gives to buying power of permanent value? Fourth, does the
plan contain any disadvantages or evils that are fundamental? .
The outstanding advantage of the plan is that it enhances
materially the immediately effective purchasing power of the
349
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buyer, to a degree depending upon the terms of payment that
are arranged. Any plan that can bring about an expansion in
current purchasing power naturally stimulates business and in
creases productive activity. In this respect instalment selling
has in recent years proven highly beneficial and has undoubtedly
provided the means for making available to the great mass of
people countless conveniences and luxuries that would otherwise
not have been within their reach. Through the new plan many
persons have discovered that by making certain sacrifices they
are able to command an increasing volume of goods of a type
which was formerly considered beyond their means. This in
crease in the effective demand for goods by large numbers of
people has proven beneficial in many ways, stimulating produc
tion, increasing employment, and thus further helping to expand
current purchasing power. To this extent it has been of distinct
advantage.
Second, the question is now quite frequently asked, Is instal
ment selling equally applicable to all classes of goods and services?
More and more, students of credit and finance are expressing the
view that the dangers in instalment selling lie in extending this
plan on too large a scale to purely consumptive goods which have
little permanency of value. The point made is that any article
which is quickly consumed or depreciates rapidly should not be
sold on the instalment plan, as such goods can never constitute
either a safe or sound basis for credit. Just where the line of
demarcation lies between sound instalment selling and unsound
instalment selling, as it is related to the character of goods sold,
has not yet been satisfactorily explained. Opinions among busi
ness men, especially those who are utilizing this plan, differ very
widely and it is quite probable that the question will not be
definitely settled except through the rather expensive test of
experience.
The third question with respect to this plan is whether or not
the stimulus which it gives to immediate buying power is of
permanent value. There are those who doubt that this plan
really affords a means for permanently expanding buying power.
They argue that in the long run business benefits very little by
enabling an individual who has a monthly income of say $200 to
spend $500 to $700 at once by mortgaging his expected income
for some months to come. His actual volume of purchasing
power is limited over any short period and the mere fact that he
350
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spends more of it at one time than at another may be of immediate
importance to current sales, but of little permanent significance.
Whether this question is as simple as stated is to be doubted,
reasonable as the argument appears superficially.
Fourth, does this plan contain any disadvantages or evils that
are fundamental? So far as instalment selling is concerned there
is nothing to indicate that the plan, per se, is fundamentally
unsound. The world has always done business through deferred
payments and probably always will do business on this basis.
The problem at issue really resolves itself into the question of the
extent to which it is safe to base credit extension on an enlarged
scale to the purchaser on the basis of anticipated earnings. That
the practice is safe in the case of certain articles, especially those
that have some permanency of value, as for instance a house,
there is no question whatever, since this plan has been tried and
tested for many years and has proven entirely successful. Whether
it can be as soundly applied to the purchase of practically every
type of goods and service is doubted by many. The present
situation which we are facing is probably only another stage in
that long succession which has taken place in the over-extension of
various forms of credit in the past. At some time or other almost
every class in the business community has abused its ability to
create credit. Whether the individual will be wiser or more
cautious in the use of the credit facilities at present afforded
him than business has been in the past is to be doubted. Those
who are most concerned about the present plan of instalment
selling have this idea in mind. They fear that the individual will
abuse his credit facilities and ultimately the entire community
will suffer as a result. However, we should bear in mind that the
mere fact that the individual may abuse his privileges should not
necessarily stamp instalment selling of a legitimate character as
bad, any more than we should consider banking, railroad credit,
or any other form of credit undesirable because at some stage or
other in the development of business it has been abused. We
must not forget that in these matters the only real test is that of
experience. It is quite probable that we shall have to be taught a
lesson which will show us definitely the limits within which instal
ment credit is sound and where it is unsound. All in all, it is
probably a wholesome sign that so many people at this stage in the
development of instalment credit are endeavoring to point out the
potential dangers which lurk in its abuse. It should always be
351
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borne in mind that seldom is anything all good or all bad. Con
sequently, let us not be unduly alarmed by those who are pes
simistic regarding instalment sales, nor become unduly optimistic
from the enthusiasm of those laboring under the delusion that
the plan will usher in the millennium of enhanced and ever
expanding purchasing power.
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